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Italy’s parabolas of GDP and subjective well-being: 









The rise and decline of the Italian economy over the past 60 years form a surprisingly regular parabola, 
if the main European partner economies are taken as benchmark, so that its vertex equal to 1 means that 
Italy completely caught-up Europe around the 1990s. This implies that, in order to repeat that 
experience of catching-up, Italy needs to grow at extraordinary rates, which are not on the horizon. The 
paper shows that the Italians’ morale is even in worse conditions and explores why. The analysis firstly 
focuses on subjective well-being (and other subjective indices), thus finding another parabola and with 
more worrying features than the economic parabola. Then it explores the role of education in shaping 
the long-run dynamics of both the economy and subjective well-being. As a first result, the paradox of 
the excess supply of educated workers in Italy becomes clearer. The second result shows how poor 
education weakened Italians’ ability to fully enjoy their income, in particular after the shocks of the 
1990s. An education policy thus becomes urgent to provide both specialized skills for production and 
general skills for people’s lives, thus definitively reinforcing the recent weak rebound in educational 
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1. Introduction  
 
The dramatic experience of the Covid-19 pandemic has posed the problem of 
precautionary lockdowns not only for shops and firms, but also for schools and 
universities. Education has thus become central to public debate. The Governor of the 
Bank of Italy already noted in his book, written in the midst of the 2008-2009 
economic recession, that: 
 
it is simplistic to think that investment in knowledge is only important for its effects on the 
growth rate of the economy. It can deeply contribute [...to] social cohesion and well-being of 
citizens (Visco, 2014, p. 8, translated by the author).  
 
Yet the wide-ranging debate on the rise and decline of Italy in the post-World 
War II period has focused attention almost exclusively on GDP and productivity, and 
when education has attracted attention, it has been considered only for its role as 
human capital useful for production (e.g., Bugamelli et al., 2018; Capussela, 2018; 
Giordano at al. 2017; Bertola and Sestito, 2013).1 This is understandable because the 
parabola that the Italian economy has depicted over more than 60 years is surprisingly 
very worrying. It is surprising because at the peak of economic development Italy 
joined the most advanced European countries even if starting from very backward 
conditions. It is now worrying because a robust recovery is not coming. Nevertheless, 
as recognised several times, the progress of a country should be viewed from a 
perspective that goes beyond GDP, because other dimensions should be considered as 
well (e.g., Stiglitz et al., 2009). 
This paper takes a step forward in filling this gap by extending the focus on 
Italians’ perceived well-being, on its relationship with GDP, and on the role of 
education in promoting both well-being and GDP. In so doing, we distinguish a period 
of growth and one of decline in Italy according to economic and extra-economic 
dimensions, so that surprising elements of continuity and change will emerge between 
the two periods. Indeed, one might expect that perceived well-being closely follows 
GDP over time, or, on the contrary, that education in Italy has improved so much over 
the decades that it helped people organise their lives and alleviate the erosion of their 
well-being when the economy declined. Instead, we will see that both expectations are 
wrong. Various evidence will show that education in Italy was more lagging behind 
and with a poorer promoting role than previously thought. Devoting far more resources 
to education is therefore the immediate policy implication for strengthening both the 
economy and people’s well-being in a more effective way than experienced in the past. 
Unfortunately, historical and consistent data extending before 2000, especially 
in the extra-economic domain, are scarce. This prevents the possibility of conducting a 
satisfactory causal analysis of the links between education, economic growth and well-
being. Moreover, the analysis is complicated by the fact that everything tends to 
become endogenous in the long run. We will therefore adopt a twofold research 
strategy to alleviate these problems. We will systematically compare Italy with the 
core countries that drove the formation of the European Union, thus removing the 
factors common to countries from the links between the variables. Such tight 
                                                 
1 There are too many books and articles on this subject, especially in Italian, to be cited all. However, an 
article that points in a different direction is Felice and Vasta (2014), which provides detailed data on the 
Human Development Index for Italy. 
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international comparison is justified by the fact that Italy shared with the original core 
of the European Union the increased openness to trade, many cultural traits, the 
development of several institutions, and even the experience of shocks, such as the 
surge of the markets globalization and the new information technologies. Secondly, we 
will look for similar patterns in the relative levels and dynamics of the variables over 
the decades by drawing from a number of different international and national statistical 
sources, however fragmentary.  
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section 2 shows that the Italian 
economy depicts a very worrying parabola during the last six decades, if observed 
from a European perspective. Section 3 discovers a parabola also for Italians’ 
subjective well-being from the same perspective. Section 4 makes evident a similar 
dynamics of education but only if the same perspective is taken. Section 5 and 6 relate 
education to the rise and decline of Italy’s economy and, respectively, of Italians’ 
subjective well-being. The paper concludes with a summary of the results and with 
some comments. 
 
2. The economic rise and decline of Italy with respect to European countries 
 
The disappointing performance of the Italian economy in the recent decades 
has been widely discussed in the literature, so it is now commonplace to talk about 
Italian economic ‘decline’. The disappointment comes mainly because the Italian 
performance was very different in the past. After WWII, in fact, Italy experienced a 
‘miraculous’ growth, such that it was able to achieve in the 1990s the income standard 
of the most advanced European countries. Becoming an increasingly open economy 
has certainly contributed to this catching-up (e.g., Federici and Marconi, 2002), 2 
together with the sectoral restructuring of production from agriculture to manufacture. 
Integration with other economies was especially tight in the case of European countries 
with which Italy shared a common culture. This fact suggests observing the 
performance of the Italian economy compared to the European countries with which it 
has had the closest relations since its extraordinary initial growth. The rise and decline 
of Italy will thus emerge with greater evidence. 
The study of how Italy rises and declines when the other countries change is a 
complex matter. A straightforward simplification is to select the relevant European 
countries, and to take the weighted average for each of the relevant variables of these 
countries as benchmark. How far Italy is from Europe over time can thus be easily 
evaluated and directly compared for the different variables, often characterized by 
different units of measurement. The set of the European countries taken as benchmark 
includes Germany (or the former Federal Republic of Germany), France, the UK, 
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg. The availability of 
historical data conditions the selection of these countries, but we are comforted by the 
fact that more than 40% of Italian exports still goes to these eight countries in 2000. To 
appreciate the homogeneity of the set, we calculate the weighted standard deviation of 
the relevant variables. Our benchmark for Italy will thus be EU8=1. 
Our first two variables are real GDP per capita (called ‘GDP’ henceforth) and 
hourly labour productivity. Data are mainly drawn from the Maddison Project 
Database and Penn World Table 10.0 for the period 1960-2019. The indices labelled as 
                                                 
2 The share of exports on GDP (at current prices) in Italy was around 9% in the interwar period, it rose 
to 13% in 1960 and to 22% in 1979. In 2019, it is 30% (Baffigi, 2015). 
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GDPI/EU and LPI/EU are obtained by dividing GDP and, respectively, labour 
productivity for Italy by the weighted average of GDP and labour productivity for EU8. 
The weights are countries’ populations in 1990. To facilitate the reading of the 
diagrams, the indices are purged from cyclical changes by using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter. The two indices thus appear as in the Figure 1, panels (a-b). The dotted lines 
represent the dispersion around unity, being calculated by subtracting half of the 
standard deviation of the variable for EU8 from 1.3 
 
< Figure 1 here > 
 
Figure 1 clearly shows that GDPI/EU depicts a parabola with great variation and 
symmetrical arms, thus providing a synthesis of the dramatic story of the Italian 
economic development of the last 60 years. In fact, it began with a gap with Europe of 
20%, it peaked 30 years later slightly overcoming the partners, and then it declined, up 
to restoring the same gap after further 30 years. Since the gap was and becomes again 
larger than the range between the dotted line and unity, Italy appears as an outlier with 
respect to our set of European countries. 
The parabola of LPI/EU is similar, although the initial gap was larger, mainly 
due to low unemployment in the boom of the early 1960s, and the final gap is smaller, 
due to high unemployment in the recent decades. The recent rebound of LPI/EU turns 
again to decline if we consider other indices of competitiveness, like Total Factor 
Productivity (TFPI/EU) and the share of the Italian real exports over EU8 exports (see 
Figure 2).4 
 
< Figure 2 here > 
 
All these parabolas well-represent both the first period, when the Italian 
economy caught up the affluence of the European partners, thus extending the 
reconstruction phase following WWII, and the second period of economic decline, 
which now appears as very severe. The decade of the 1990s emerges as the watershed 
for GDPI/EU, which postponed the peak with respect to productivity, thanks to the 
increase of the employment rate in the 1980s. 
Therefore, as the Italian economy experienced exceptional growth over 30 
years, it then experienced an exceptional decline of symmetrical magnitude. The 
comparison with the European partner countries tells us that to reach them again, it 
would be necessary to renew the ‘miraculous’ growth, without the possibility, however, 
of benefiting from a sectoral restructuring similar to that of the time. 
 
3. The relative rise and decline of subjective well-being in Italy 
 
Italy exhibits a peculiar dynamics not only in the economy, but also in the 
subjective well-being of its population. Another parabola in fact emerges, and even 
more worrying. 
                                                 
3 In the case of productivity, Luxembourg is dropped for lack of data, so that EU7=1 in this case, but 
this would not sensibly change the figures.  
4 For ease of reading, the export share is made equal to 1 in the beginning year, though it was 16.3%. 
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Data on life satisfaction, as the most used version of subjective well-being, are 
drawn from the Eurobarometer Survey. This provides the share of people ‘very’ and 
‘fairly’ satisfied with life for the period 1973-2019 for nationally representative 
samples. We then calculate the index labelled SWBI/EU as our previous indices like 
GDPI/EU, and reproduced in Figure 3 (solid line). 
 
< Figure 3 here > 
 
Figure 3 shows that the parabola of SWBI/EU is pronounced like that of GDPI/EU, 
but it differs because it never approaches unity. Moreover, the dotted line tells us that 
Italy always remained an outlier, while our European countries tended to converge one 
toward the other. 
The decline of life satisfaction of Italy in both absolute terms and relatively to 
Europe has attracted little attention with respect to the decline of the economy. Even 
the studies in happiness economics often take Italy as a successful example for the rise 
of life satisfaction in absolute terms for the overall period, although less updated 
(Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; Clark et al., 2008). Such neglect might be due to the 
suspicion that the changes in this type of data are not very reliable, or to the 
expectation that life satisfaction closely follows GDP, thus remaining redundant. A 
supplement of investigation is thus needed to check these presumptions. 
A large national dataset provides information that confirms the decline of 
Italians’ subjective well-being. In fact, the Italian National Institute of Statistics 
collects data on satisfaction for six life domains since 2001 using a sample of about 
25,000 people (ISTAT 2021), which is more than ten times the usual samples of the 
Eurobarometer Survey. The life domains regard the individuals’ economic conditions, 
job, family relationships, friends, leisure and health. Having calculated the share of 
people who are ‘very’ or ‘rather’ satisfied, these shares for all six types of satisfaction 
exhibit the tendency to decline in the 2001-2007 or 2001-2013 periods, i.e. when also 
life satisfaction drawn from Eurobarometer dataset tends to decline (see the third 
column of Table 1). Satisfaction with the job and with the economic conditions also 
follows life satisfaction in the recent rebound, i.e. in the entire 2001-2019 period, thus 
exhibiting a significant correlation (at 1%) of 0.84 and 0.79 with life satisfaction, 
respectively. The index of life satisfaction lies, on average, between the indices of 
satisfaction with the family, friends, health and with the job, which are greater, and the 
indices of satisfaction with the economic conditions and with leisure, which are lower 
(see the fourth column of Table 1).  
 
< Table 1 here > 
 
The recent trend of subjective well-being in Italy compared with our set of 
European countries is confirmed by another index, called ‘Cantril ladder’, according to 
which respondents to the survey question value their lives today on a 0 to 10 scale, in 
comparison with the worst possible life as a 0 and the best possible life as a 10. This 
index shows that subjective well-being declined in Italy by 0.61 points from 2005-
2008 to 2016-2018, but increased in EU7 by 0.10 points (Helliwell et al., 2019). 
But what does subjective well-being tell us beyond what we already know 
about the trends of GDP? Figure 4 reproduces the dynamics of SWBI/EU and GDPI/EU, 
and it makes evident that the two parabolas differ in some respects. First, the parabola 
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of SWBI/EU lies very below that of GDPI/EU parabola, and in particular, SWBI/EU starts 
with hesitation to rise when GDPI/EU was much greater; it ceased rising although the 
Italy-EU8 gap was still significantly open; and it remained there, fluctuating within the 
range 0.90-0.96 in the period around 1990-2003. Then it dropped until the minimum in 
2013 with an Italy-EU8 gap by 35%, far below GDPI/EU. This pattern suggests that the 
income earned by the Italians was never been completely satisfactory, as if something 
prevented Italians from enjoying their success in catching up the wealth of the other 
Europeans.  
 
< Figure 4 here > 
 
The second main difference between the two parabolas concerns the steepness 
of the rise with respect to the steepness of the decline. More precisely, calculation on 
the raw data shows that SWBI/EU increases by 1.1 point for one point of rise of GDPI/EU 
from 1976 to 1989, whereas SWBI/EU decreases by 2.0 point for one point of decline of 
GDPI/EU from 2002 to 2013. This fact suggests that the rise of income yields less 
satisfaction compared with dissatisfaction of an equal decline of income, thus 
immediately recalling the psychological phenomenon that Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) named ‘loss aversion.’5 However, in our case, SWBI/EU tended to fall for 13 
years, and in 2019 it is still lower of almost 0.2 with respect to the peak. In other words, 
our case is a long-run phenomenon requiring specific investigation. 
Let us begin to recognise that a particularly heavy fiscal restriction hit Italians 
in the 1990s. Figure 5 gives a measure of this shock by comparing Italy with the three 
largest European countries: before 1992, Italy had the biggest deficit in the primary 
balance, and after 1992 Italy had the biggest surplus. 
 
< Figure 5 here > 
 
More taxation and fewer public services put families in great economic strain, 
so that the need to earn more income became more pressing, and the second wage 
earner in the family became a necessity. Here, however, families encountered another 
shock: the flexibilisation of the labour market, which made jobs more uncertain and 
contributed to increase economic inequality. Around the 1990s, in fact, Italy reduced 
the protection of employment more than our set of European countries, as Figure 6 
well-represents.6 Specifically, Germany had a similar reduction, but starting from a 
lower level of protection; France maintained it at a high level; and the UK always had 
a low level of protection.  
 
< Figure 6 here > 
 
Therefore, the world around the families had changed, so that they too had to 
change. Many studies on the reasons underlying the economic decline of Italy point to 
the failure of the firms system to restructure its production process in the face of the 
                                                 
5 ‘Loss aversion’ occurs when “the aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of money appears 
to be greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same amount” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 
p. 279). 
6 Data on Luxembourg is missing in this case. 
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‘revolutions’ of ICT and of globalization (Bugamelli et al., 2018). Similarly, 
underlying the decline of Italians’ well-being could be their failure to restructure their 
way of life.  
But why such failures? 
 
4. The relative rise and decline of education in Italy 
 
School and university education is usually considered as most important for 
economic growth, thus being often called ‘human capital’. But it also displays 
individual non-pecuniary returns, in terms of more health, better social relationships, 
greater foresight, and, eventually, higher subjective well-being (Oreopoulos and 
Salvanes, 2011). Over the long run, education tends to be transmitted through the 
parent-child relationship (Dickson et al., 2015), it appears to contribute positively to 
democracy (Milligan et al., 2004; Hoskins, 2008), and to building a more trusting 
society (Huang et al., 2009). Therefore, considering the changes in education over a 
60-year period, we can take it as an important component of the social background that 
conditions politics and institutions. 
The increase in education is a worldwide phenomenon, which affected Italy not 
only in the period of catching-up with the European countries, but also in its economic 
decline. In fact, the average total years of education in Italian adult population was 4.6 
in 1960, 7.3 in 1990, and 10.2 in 2019. Nevertheless, the comparison with our 
European group of countries shows a different pattern7. 
If we compute the index EdI/EU by following our usual procedure, a surprising 
yet familiar parabola with a recent rebound emerges, as Figure 7 shows. The surprise 
comes from the declining part, and from the very low peak, which lies 14% below the 
European benchmark. The Italian position is thus very far from the European group, 
which rapidly becomes more homogenous instead. A contribution to the decline of 
education in Italy comes from heavy cuts in government expenditure in education. The 
dashed line in Figure 7, computed as usual, clearly shows how steep was the relative 
decline in such expenditure. The greater levels of this index testify its inefficiency.8 
 
< Figure 7 here > 
 
The particularly low levels of EdI/EU are mainly due to the component of people 
with tertiary education. By computing this component with our usual procedure, it 
fluctuates in the period 1960- early 2000s between 0.42 and 0.47 with a peak in the 
early 1980s. Fortunately, in the last two decades it grows up, but achieving only 0.50.9 
Another weak component of the Italian education system concerns childcare services 
for 0-2 years old. Comparing Italy with the restricted set of our European countries 
(Germany, the UK, and France), children enrolled in childcare services are 16% lower 
in 2005, 39% lower in 2010, and 32% in 2017, in proportion of all children (OECD 
2020). 
                                                 
7 Data are drawn from Our World Data, Global Education, which is based on Lee and Lee (2016), Barro 
and Lee (2018), and UNDP (2018). 
8  For the inefficiency of the Italian education system see Rossi (1997), and, in an international 
comparison, Giambona et al. (2011). 
9 The original data are drawn from Barro and Lee (2013). 
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The lagging condition of education in Italy is well-known (Bertola and Sestito, 
2013), especially since comparable international data on the competences of students 
are available (OECD, 2016), i.e. since about 15 years ago. But even in the early phase, 
when conditions in Italy were rather backward, the rise of education to catch up 
Europe was not satisfactory. In fact, two countries that started in worse conditions, i.e. 
South Korea and Finland, were able to fare much better: the ratio of average education 
in the population between Italy and South Korea went from 1.48 in 1960, through 0.99 
in 1970 to 0.87 in 1980; the ratio with respect to Finland was 1.14, 0.96, and 0.84 in 
the three years respectively (Lee and Lee, 2016). Moreover, recent international data 
on the quality of education, measured by students’ competence in science, reading and 
mathematics, show that Italy is far behind our EU8, while South Korea and Finland are 
among the top performers in the world (OECD, 2016).  
The reason for this disappointing result is often sought in the organization of 
the educational system, but the subjective perspective of the students is also 
illuminating. For example, the share of 11-, 13- and 15-year-olds who report liking 
school in 2005/2006 is less than half in Italy compared to our EU7 (OECD, 2009). The 
share of 15-year-old students who say “I feel like I belong at school” dropped in Italy 
by 18% between 2003 and 2015, while it decreased in the EU7 by 10% (OECD, 2017). 
The relative level of Italian education has recovered only recently, especially 
thanks to the reform of the university system, which introduced the so-called 3+2 track. 
But the gap is still very high, and the recovery is rather slow. In order to achieve the 
past peak at the growth rate of 2006-2017, EdI/EU would take 21 years, and to achieve 
EU8, EdI/EU would take 63 years.  
 
5. Relating education to economic growth in Italy 
 
By comparing EdI/EU with GDPI/EU and LPI/EU, as in Figure 8, a peculiarity of 
Italian economic development becomes evident: Italy was able to catch up the 
European economies without the need to be properly equipped with human capital, 
being education an approximate measure of human capital available for the economy’s 
production. Indeed, both GDPI/EU and LPI/EU were rising fast in the 1960s, while EdI/EU 
stagnated. A moderate rise of EdI/EU followed for 15 years. In the mid-1980s, EdI/EU 
ceased to rise when LPI/EU and then GDPI/EU achieved the highest levels, without any 
clear link between one peak and the other. Economic growth thus appears only loosely 
linked with human capital when this is rising. However, our three variables become 
synchronous when they decline.  
< Figure 8 here > 
 
Therefore, this evidence is able to reflect the well-known fact that Italy firstly 
successfully specialised in the production that requires low-skilled labour, but then it 
maintained such specialisation also when times changed, thus exhibiting an economic 
decline. Our evidence further suggests that the failure in restructuring the economy in 
order to overcome the challenges of globalization and technological innovations dates 
back to well before the decade in which failure became evident, i.e. the 1990s. In fact, 
in the first 30 years considered in Figure 8 the rise of education was moderate, and it 
ceased to grow early. Nevertheless, the available evidence shows that workers with 
secondary education in Italy suffered from higher unemployment than workers with 
 9 
less education, at least in 1963-1970 period (Valli, 1973),10 and that this was a unique 
phenomenon in Western Europe, where the reverse was true, at least in the 1977-1992 
period (Manacorda and Petrongolo, 1999). 
While the period of rapid economic growth was characterised by many 
unemployed with intermediate education, the period of decline is characterised by 
many unemployed with advanced education, relatively to the European counterparts. 
Figure 9 clearly shows the reversed order, with respect to theoretical expectation, of 
the three groups of unemployment distinguished for educational level in the years 
1998-2019. Unemployed with tertiary education reach almost the double in Italy 
relatively to EU8 in the most recent years. 
 
< Figure 9 here > 
 
This evidence reveals an excess supply of educated workers despite the low 
levels of EdI/EU, and despite its decline for 15 years. A confirmation that this is an 
excess of supply comes from the low and declining returns to education in Italy with 
respect to the European countries found by Montenegro and Patrinos (2014). On the 
basis of their data, the computation of return to a year of education for Italy relatively 
to Germany, the UK, and France gives an index of 0.72 in 2005, which further declines 
to 0.56 in 2012.11 This can help understand the ‘Visco paradox’, as put forward by the 
Governor of the Bank of Italy, according to which Italy is an international outlier for 
the low return to advanced education despite the scarcity of human capital (Visco, 
2014). 
In the long run, low returns to advanced education may discourage families to 
invest in the education of their offspring, thus feeding a vicious circle. But the 
evidence above suggests that the trigger of the vicious circle comes from the demand 
side of the labour market rather than from the supply side. This is confirmed by the net 
‘brain drain’ from Italy, which was already heavy in the 1990s, and it has become 
much heavier in the following decades (Becker et al., 2004; Anelli and Peri, 2017).12 
Therefore, such vicious circle, together with low levels of expenditure on education, 
may explain the prolonged low levels of EdI/EU.  
But why did international competition not induce Italian firms to restructure 
their production, thus increasing their demand for educated workers to introduce the 
necessary innovations? Pellegrino and Zingales (2017) provide an answer by showing 
that Italian entrepreneurs are not selected for their skills, which enabled them to 
appreciate the advantage of hiring educated workers. In other words, entrepreneurs 
themselves are not highly educated. According to ISTAT (2018), the average years of 
education of entrepreneurs of the Italian small firms in 2015 are 11.4, which is 0.6 
more than their employees. This fact is consistent with our evidence showing that 
scarcity of education in the population is an endemic Italian feature. 
                                                 
10 Unemployment of workers with tertiary education was, instead, very low (Valli, 1973). 
11 Other sources and types of estimations provide similar figures. For example, by computing the same 
index from OECD (2014), the figure for the relative returns to tertiary education in 2010 is 0.64. Further 
evidence in support of the hypothesis of excess supply of educated workers regards over-education, 
which is 24% higher in Italy with respect to EU3 (Germany, France, and the UK) in 2003, by taking the 
basic figures from Ghignoni and Verashchagina (2014). 
12  Anelli and Peri (2017) further argue with simulations that subsidising education would increase 
migration of educated workers to other European countries. 
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6. Relating education to subjective well-being in Italy 
 
Recent international research on education and subjective well-being finds that 
the relationship between them is positive if observed over time (FitzRoy and Nolan, 
2020), or if properly mediated by the specific life domains in which education clearly 
enables individuals with greater material, social and psychological resources 
(Powdthavee et al., 2015; Ferrante, 2017). Consistent evidence emerges in our case of 
Italy over the past 45 years. 
We already observed in Figure 4 that the parabola of SWBI/EU lies below with 
respect to GDPI/EU, and, by comparing with Figure 7, we can observe that SWBI/EU lies 
above and postponed with respect to EdI/EU. A suggestive twofold hypothesis thus 
emerges: in general, Italians were not able to fully enjoy their income, in comparison 
with the European counterparts, because they were poorly educated; in particular, 
Italians experienced such a drop in life satisfaction when their income declined 
because poor education made them especially unprepared to receive the shocks of the 
1990s. Poor educated entrepreneurs, workers, heads of households find it more 
difficult to adjust to external changes. 
Table 2 offers a nice description of this hypothesis. It reports the results of 
regressing SWBI/EU on only GDPI/EU, then also on EdI/EU, properly lagged, and by 
finally adding a dummy on the slope of EdI/EU taking the value of 0 until the year of 
maximum structural break onwards, i.e. 1999, and then taking the value of 1.13 A 
further check appears in the last column, where the dummy on the intercept is also 
considered. Data used are not purged from cycle. The table shows that the dynamics of 
SWBI/EU can be more closely tracked if, besides GDPI/EU, the dynamics of EdI/EU is 
taken into account. The table also shows that SWBI/EU is tracked even more closely by 
singling out the most recent period, being the coefficient of EdI/EU significantly higher. 
In words, the decline of education and its recent rebound seem to play a greater role in 
the dynamics of SWBI/EU than before. 
 
< Tab. 2 here > 
 
The turning point of individuals’ well-being as driven by the turning point of 
both income and education is a hypothesis that needs further empirical evidence. 
Unfortunately, the scarcity of historical data prevents a satisfactory test, but some 
useful information can be drawn from World Values Survey/European Values Studies 
(WVS/EVS). This is the integration of internationally comparable surveys collecting 
information on many aspects of people’s lives. Each survey uses nationally 
representative samples of the population, and it has been administered in years 1981, 
1990, 1999, 2008/2009 and 2017 for our set of European countries.14 Specifically, the 
survey provides information for two subjective aspects that are closely correlated to 
both life satisfaction and education. These aspects are ‘trust in others’ and ‘feeling of 
control and decision over one’s life events’, also called ‘internal locus of control’ in 
psychology. We build our indices of TrustI/EU and LocI/EU by considering the share of 
                                                 
13 The Wald test statistic is 38.92 with p-value=0.0000. 
14 Lack of data in WVS/EVS for Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg forces us to exclude them from our 
EU8. Nevertheless, these countries weigh only 6% on the population of EU8. 
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respondents who say that most people can be trusted, and, respectively, who indicate 9 
or 10 on a 10-step scale in answering the question “how much freedom of choice and 
control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.” The WVS/EVS enables us 
to build also a third index that captures individuals’ objective cooperative behaviour, 
because it provides the interviewer’s rating of whether the respondents were ‘very 
interested’ (on a 3-step scale) during the interview. This is a cooperative behaviour 
because the interview is a time-consuming activity without any tangible reward. 
Unfortunately, the available information is different in this case, because it includes 
the four main countries only, i.e. Germany, the UK, France and Italy, for the years 
1990, 1999, 2005/2006, 2008/2009, and 2017. Nevertheless, we consider 
CooperationI/EU as our third variable. 
Trust in others, the internal locus of control, and cooperation generally have 
two interesting properties: they can be predicted by income and education, and they 
can predict life satisfaction. This is evident from a variety of studies (Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2002; Albanese and de Blasio, 2014; Huang et al., 2009; Bartolini et al., 2013; 
Verme, 2009; Helliwell et al. 2020; Schurer, 2017; Buddelmeyer and Powdthavee, 
2016). We can find specific confirmation by using the WVS/EVS for our set of 
European countries inclusive of Italy, and for the set of the available years. Table 3 in 
the Appendix reports such comforting result firstly from regressing on individual basis 
Trust, Loc, and Cooperation against income, education and socio-economic controls, 
and then from regressing Life Satisfaction against Trust, Loc, and Cooperation and 
socio-economic controls.15  
Unfortunately, the number of the individual observations substantially 
diminishes when considering single years and countries. Therefore, our analysis 
proceeds by taking the average of Trust, Loc and Cooperation for each of our countries 
and years, and then by interpolating these averages for the intermediate years, and 
finally by computing the series as usual, having distinguished Italy from the other 
European countries. Figure 10 shows the results: TrustI/EU (solid line) and LocI/EU 
(dashed line) exhibit two parabolas with the peak in the 1990s; CooperationI/EU 
exhibits a decline when the other two indices decline; all indices vary a lot; LocI/EU and 
CooperationI/EU end with a rebound.
16 
 
< Figure 10 here > 
 
The similar temporal pattern of EdI/EU, GDPI/EU, TrustI/EU, LocI/EU and SWBI/EU 
over the period 1981-2017 suggests that the turning point of education and income in 
                                                 
15 OLS regressions are always used for easy of reading and comparability of the results, although the 
variables are categorical. Estimates control for respondent’s age, age squared, gender, working 
conditions (full-time, part-time, self-employed, retired, housewife, student, unemployment, other), 
marital status (married, living together as married, divorced, separated, widowed, single), country and 
year. Education is measured by distinguishing primary, secondary, and tertiary education or higher. 
Estimates use the ‘robust’ option.  
16 Another source provides consistent results with ours. According to Helliwell et al. (2020), respondents 
to the survey question in 2019 “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your freedom to choose what you 
do with your life?” report a score for Italy of 0.78 relatively to the score for EU7; respondents to the 
question “If you were in trouble, do you have relatives or friends you can count on to help you whenever 
you need them, or not?” report a relative score of 0.97; respondents to the question “Is corruption 
widespread throughout the government (within businesses) or not?” report a relative score of 0.55. 
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the 1990s may have affected the turning point of subjective well-being by also 
involving the personal characteristics of trust in others, and the feeling of being in 
control of their life. The concomitant decline of CooperationI/EU until the early 2000s 
strengthens this presumption. The fact that these three individual characteristics change 
so much in the long-run, while exhibiting similarities with the dynamics of education, 
suggests calling them as ‘skills’, rather than preferences, or, better, ‘non-cognitive 
skills’, as Heckman et al. (2006) and Heckman and Corbin (2016) would call them. 
Therefore, the rise and decline of Italy with respect to the international context 
is an unfortunate dynamics that not only refers to the economy, but also to people’s 
cognitive and non-cognitive skills, and thus to both the possibility and ability to enjoy 
life. Education plays an extended role, because it not only increases human capital 
useful for production, but also skills useful for people’s lives. Indeed, the 1990s mark a 






The focus of the paper is on the role of education in Italy’s development from a 
rather long-run perspective and in a comparative way to the set of 8 European 
countries (or, sometimes, a subset that includes Germany, France, and the UK). The 
measures used to observe development are not limited to GDP and productivity growth, 
but extended to the changing trends of subjective well-being. Therefore, education has 
been considered not only as human capital useful for production, which is usual, but 
also as skills useful for life, which is often evoked but rarely investigated. One of the 
reasons for this is the scarcity of historical series on Italians’ subjective aspects, so that 
data are to be sought from a number of statistical sources, possibly international and 
non-fragmentary.  
The extended focus of the paper makes the case of Italy interesting also for 
more general analysis, such as evaluating the importance of education in countries’ 
development among policy priorities. Nevertheless, the five main results obtained 
make evident the peculiar pattern of the Italian development: that of a parabola 
opening downwards. 
The preliminary result concerns the severity of the Italian economic decline. 
While Total Factor Productivity of Italy, which is often considered in evaluating the 
economic performance, appears almost constant since about three decades, the 
comparison with Europe shows an even worse picture. In fact, the Italian economy has 
declined so much in the last 30 years that it has restored the same gap as 60 years ago. 
This provides a measure of what economic growth is necessary to catch up again 
Europe. 
The second result makes evident that also subjective well-being in Italy, 
relatively to Europe, rises in a first period and then declines in a symmetric way. But 
subjective well-being does not strictly follow the parabola of the economy for two 
reasons: because the gaps with Europe are greater, so that the catch-up never took 
place even at the peak of the 1990s, and because the relative decline of subjective well-
being is steeper than the economic decline. This suggests that Italians are less able to 
derive life satisfaction from their income with respect to the European counterparts, 
and that this difficulty worsens along the economic decline. Such drop of satisfaction 
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seems to regard not only life but also other important domains, like work, finance, 
family and friends. 
The third result reveals that the monotonic improvement in the levels of 
education among Italians, over the entire period considered, becomes again a slow rise 
and a slow decline, with some recent rebound, if put against the education of 
Europeans. Moreover, the gap with Europe always remains very large, because the 
rising phase was clearly insufficient, and the recent rebound very modest. The lagging 
condition of education in Italy is well-known, but it now takes a very worrying gap, 
since the gap of 2019 is similar to that of the mid-1970s. 
The fourth result helps to understand the ‘Visco paradox’, according to which 
Italy is an international outlier because of the low return to advanced education despite 
the scarcity of human capital (Visco, 2014). While confirmation emerges for the low 
average levels of education in Italy with respect to those of Europe, it should be 
observed that the levels of GDP are relatively higher, and even increasing in some few 
years when education already diminished. At the same time, evidence on 
unemployment shows that educated workers in Italy have more difficulty finding a job 
than less educated workers, if compared with Europe. Therefore, returns to education 
may be lower because educated workers are in excess supply, despite their scarcity 
according to international standards. 
The fifth result concerns the relationship between people’s education and 
subjective well-being in Italy. International studies on the issue warn us that economic, 
social, and psychological mediators complicate the relationship, and that this is 
difficult to observe over time, so that our fifth result is rather provisional. In general 
terms, our evidence shows that poor education may have weakened Italians’ ability to 
fully enjoy their income, in comparison with the Europeans. In particular, it seems that 
insufficient education in the period of economic growth made Italians unprepared to 
receive the economic shocks of the 1990s, so that they experienced a severe drop in 
life satisfaction when their income declined. Those shocks were undoubtedly heavy 
even for the international standards, but people’s reaction was especially negative and 
prolonged. This is also evidenced by the concomitant deterioration of some ‘non-
cognitive skills’ of people, which are proved to be closely linked to both education and 
subjective well-being, i.e. trust in others, the feeling of control and decision over one’s 
life events, and the attitude to cooperate.  
The deterioration of these skills is remarkable, because they are usually 
regarded as stable. Together with the poor performance of education, therefore, such 
deterioration could capture the long-run worsening of the social context in which 
policies and institutions operated in the recent Italian history.17  Therefore, a more 
complete picture of the explanations for why policies and institutions failed to bring 
economic growth and well-being to Italians emerges. 
The policy implication of giving priority to education appears obvious, but the 
results seen above suggest some qualifications. Education should not only mean 
specialising an adequate workforce for production, but it should also mean investing in 
children, in the continuous training of persons of all ages, in cultural policy, as well as 
in the quality of teachers in order to both form competitive skills at an international 
level, and effectively raise the average education level of the population. 
                                                 
17 International studies show that trust is strongly related to economic growth (Algan and Cahuc, 2014), 
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Fig. 1: GDP per capita (panel a) and labour productivity (panel b) of Italy by taking 
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Notes: GDP(I/EU) = GDP of Italy / GDP of EU8; dispersion of GDP(EU) = (1 – weighted standard 
deviation of GDP of EU8)/2; productivity (I/EU) = labour productivity of Italy / labour productivity of 
EU8; dispersion of productivity (EU) = (1 – weighted standard deviation of labour productivity of 
EU8)/2; GDP = real GDP per capita in 2011 US$; EU8 = Germany, France, the UK, Netherlands, 
Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg. Data are de-cycled with the Hodrick-Prescott filter (with 
lambda=6.25). 
Sources: for GDP: Maddison Project Database, version 2018 and Eurostat online database; for 
productivity: Penn World Tables 10.0 and OECD online database. 
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Fig. 2: Total Factor Productivity and labour productivity of Italy by taking EU8 as 
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Notes: TFP (I/EU) = Total Factor Productivity of Italy / Total Factor Productivity of EU8; export (I/EU) 
= exports of Italy / exports of EU8 with 1970 = 1; productivity (I/EU) = labour productivity of Italy / 
labour productivity of EU8; export = exports of goods and services in 2010 US$; EU8 = Germany, 
France, the UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg. Data are de-cycled with the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
Sources: for TFP: Penn World Tables 10.0 and OECD online database; for exports: World Bank (2021); 
for productivity: Penn World Tables 10.0 and OECD online database. 
 
 
Fig. 3: People’s life satisfaction in Italy by taking EU8 as benchmark (=1); and 
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Life Satisfaction (I/EU) dispersion of LS (EU)
 
Notes: Life Satisfaction (I/EU) = Life Satisfaction in Italy / Life Satisfaction in EU8; dispersion of LS 
(EU) = (1 – weighted standard deviation of Life Satisfaction in EU8)/2; Life Satisfaction = share of 
people ‘very’ and ‘fairly’ satisfied with life; EU8 = Germany, France, the UK, Netherlands, Belgium, 
Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg. Data are de-cycled with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
Sources: Eurobarometer Survey. 
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Fig. 5: Government deficit or surplus net of interest payments as percentage of 
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Notes: EU7 = Germany, France, the UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Ireland. 
Sources: elaborations from Crafts and Magnani (2013: Tab.3.8). 
 
 
Fig. 7: Average education in adult population in 1960-2017, and government 
expenditure on education in Italy in 1995-2019 by taking EU8 as benchmark (=1); 
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Education (I/EU) dispersion of Education (EU)
government expenditure on education (I/EU)
 
Notes: Education (I/EU) = Education in Italy / Education in EU8; dispersion of Education (EU) = (1 – 
weighted standard deviation of Education in EU8)/2; Education = average total years of schooling for 
adult population; government expenditure on education = government expenditure on education in Italy 
/ government expenditure on education in EU8; EU8 = Germany, France, the UK, Netherlands, Belgium, 
Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg; data are de-cycled with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Data on 
education are originally provided every 5 years until 1990, so that interpolation estimates missing data. 
Sources: for Education: Our World Data, Global Education, which is based on Lee and Lee (2016), 
Barro and Lee (2018), and UNDP (2018); for government expenditure on education: Eurostat, 
Government Finance Statistics. 
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Fig. 8: Average education in adult population, GDP, and labour productivity by taking 
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Fig. 9: Unemployment distinguished for educational level in the period 1998-2019 in 







































Fig. 10: Trust in others, locus of control, and cooperation in Italy by taking European 
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Notes: Trust (I/EU) = Trust in Italy / Trust in EU5; Locus of control (I/EU) = Locus of control in Italy / 
Locus of control in EU5; Cooperation (I/EU) = Cooperation in Italy / Cooperation in EU3; Trust = share 
of respondents who say that most people can be trusted; Locus of control = people who indicate 9 or 10 
on a 10-step scale in answering the question “how much freedom of choice and control you feel you 
have over the way your life turns out;” Cooperation = interviewer’s rating of whether the respondent 
was ‘very interested’ (on a 3-step scale) during the interview; EU5 = Germany, France, the UK, 
Netherlands, and Denmark; EU3 = Germany, France, and the UK. Data are de-cycled with the Hodrick-
Prescott filter. 










Tab. 1: Satisfaction with life and with other life domains. Rates of change, and overall 
averages 
 




with life (Eurobarometer) -1.67*** 70.0% 
with the job -0.37*** 76.3% 
with the economic conditions 
2001-2013 
-1.42*** 50.0% 
with the family -0.24** 90.4% 
with friends -0.34* 82.7% 




Notes: Annual rate of change = coefficient of regressing the variable against time, with *** for p<0.001, 
** for p<0.05, * for p<0.1. 
Sources: for life satisfaction: Eurobarometer Survey; for satisfaction with the other domains: ISTAT 
(2021).  
 
Tab. 2: Tracking Life satisfaction in Italy with respect to EU8 over time (1974-2019) 




Life Satisfaction (I/EU) 1974-2019 
1.04*** 0.61*** 0.94*** 0.85*** 
GDP (I/EU) 
(0.89) (3.88) (7.06) (6.05) 
1.07*** 1.09*** 1.06*** 
Education (I/EU) --- 
(3.77) (5.02) (5.01) 




-0.74* D2000-2019 --- --- --- 
(1.77) 
-0.16 -0.61*** -0.97*** -0.86*** 
Constant 
(1.31) (3.83) (7.08) (5.80) 
No. of observations 47 47 47 47 
Adj. R2 0.596 0.688 0.818 0.827 
Durbin-Watson (2,47)=0.61 (3,47)=0.77 (4,47)=1.48 (5,47)=1.68 
Notes: OLS regressions of Life Satisfaction (I/EU) against GDP (I/EU), Education (I/EU), Education 
(I/EU) multiplied by a dummy (D) taking 0 in 1974-1999 and 1 in 2000-2019, and the same dummy. 
Education (I/EU) is lagged of 6 years. 
*** for p<0.001, ** for p<0.05, * for p<0.1 






Tab. 3: Estimations of Trust, Loc, Cooperation, and Life Satisfaction by using the 




Trust Loc Cooperation Life Satisfaction 
0.018*** 0.78*** 0.010*** 0.090*** 0.057*** 
Income 
(11.74) (11.26) (4.77) (11.85) 
--- 
(7.98) 
0.039*** 0.49*** 0.037*** 0.053*** 0.014* 
Education 




Trust --- --- --- --- 
(14.46) (13.12) 
0.309*** 0.304*** 
Loc --- --- --- --- 
(36.22) (35.54) 
0.226*** 0.206*** 
Cooperation --- --- --- --- 
(8.09) (7.29) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
No. Obs. 19,721 19,402 15,382 14,644 14,644 14,644 
R2 0.135 0.049 0.136 0.112 0.229 0.233 
Notes: Robust OLS regressions with the sample of the available countries within the set of EU8+Italy, 
over the available waves. Controls include respondent’s age, age squared, gender, working conditions 
(full-time, part-time, self-employed, retired, housewife, student, unemployment, other), marital status 
(married, living together as married, divorced, separated, widowed, single), country and year. Education 
is measured by distinguishing primary, secondary, and tertiary education or higher.  
*** for p<0.001, *** for p<0.05, * for p<0.1 
Sources: World Values Survey/European Values Studies.  
 
